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STATE REGULATION OF THE CANAL. CORPORATION 
IN COLORADO. 
I NAPPLICABILITY of the common law doctrine of riparian rights to conditions in the arid region moved the first territorial 
legislature of Colorado to recognize the counter doctrine of 
prior appropriation. In fact, the right to the water in the streams of 
Colorado, by prior appropriation, antedated any legislation. "It wa,s 
the common law of the people, and legislation, both national and ter-
ritorial, was but a recognition declaratory of the right as it had 
theretofore and then existed."1 Adhering to territorial precedent, 
Colorado was the first state to incorporate the priority doctrine in 
its organic law. 
The state constitution declares the water of every natural stream 
to be public property and dedicated to the use of the people of the 
state. It guarantees the right to divert for a beneficial purpose the 
unappropriated waters of every natural stream (within the state) 
to riparian and non-riparian lands; . To this end the right of eminent 
domain is granted across public, private and corporate lands, to 
persons, associations and corporations constructing ditches, canals 
and flumes. The controlling principle of water apportionment is 
that priority of appropriation gives superiority of right among ap-
propriators for a like beneficial purpose.2 
No sooner was the organic law promulgated than it was strained 
by a lack of correspondence with new economic conditions. Blind 
to the impending growth and importance of the canal corporation, 
the constitutional convention had merely assimilated it to general 
principles of control evolved with reference to non-corporate canals. 
Upon the legislature, consequently, fell the difficult ·task of giving 
effect to the general principles and adapting them to the character 
of the canal corporation. 
~ l Colo. App. 57. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Company. 
9 Colo. Const. XVI., secs. 5·7; 6 Colo. 449. To illustrate the distribution of watllf" 
for irrigation under this theory: the first appropriator from a stream takes what he 
needs up to the decreed limit of his right; then, if water remains in the stream, the 
later appropriators take their supply in the order of date of acquisition of rights. If 
the volume of a stream were uniform from year to year, all appropriations up to tlae 
flow of the stream would be equally assured, and the only important feature of a 
water-right would be its volume. But the fiow of a stream varies daily and an· 
nually. At times it will supply all the diverting canals; and at other times. only a 
few of them. In the event of inadequate :flow the appropriators are supplied in the 
order of the date of their water·rlghts. J. S. Greene. Acquirement of Water-Rights in 
the Arkansas Valley in Colorado, 1913, in U. S. Dept. of Agr., Office of F;xp. Sta., 
BWJ. No. 140, p. 12. 
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When the constitutional convention met, the canal corporation 
was a negligible factor in Colorado agriculture. Prior to I878 
most canals were constructed on a small scale, either by individual 
farmers or co-operative associations of farmers to water their own 
lands. With agricultural expansion to lands above the first river 
bottom, the necessary irrigation works required a larger outlay of 
capital than the farmer could furnish and canal development tem-
porarily halted. Presently capital observed in canal construction a 
lucrative field; and foreign or eastern corporations hastened to build 
large canals in advance of agricultural settlement, hoping to reap 
profits from the sale of water-rights and land to settlers.3 
This development was begun in northeastern Colorado by a 
Scotch corporation in the years I878-I883. It built the Larimer 
and Weld canal of 50 miles at a cost of $I50,ooo, and the High 
Line of 83 miles at a cost of $750,ooo. The same company later 
constructed the Loveland and Greeley canal of 25 miles and the 
Platte Valley canal of 20 miles. Together these four canals had 
a capacity to water n5,ooo acres.4 Four hundred miles of cor-
porate canals were being constructed in I884 alone. By I885-I886 
a majority of the canals building were financed by corporations as 
speculative enterprises. Numerous large irrigation works were 
commenced, and some completed, by corporate interests in I887-
r8go. 5 In the bench lands north of La Junta the Colorado Land and 
'Vater Company built a 75-rnile canal capable of watering 50,000 
acres. The Empire Land and Canal Company had 100,000 acres 
under ditch on the Rio Grande del Norte and in San Luis park. 
Other large enterprises in the San Luis valley were the Rio Grande 
canal, capable of wateripg 240,000 acres, and the Del Norte with 
a similar capacity.6 Not all of the tributary acres were actually cul-
tivated; many were merely under ditch. This exploitation was 
made possible by the railroad extension into the unsettled regions 
in the eighties, inviting immigration and offering facilities calculated 
to reimburse the promoter. 
1 Agriculture as Developed by Irrigation in Colorado, by a Committee of the Na-
tional Irrigation Congress, 1894. p. 10; Report of the Colorado State Engineer, 1885· 
1886, p. 216. 
• 13 Annual Report of the U. S. Geological Survey. 1891-1892, Part III, 139; R. 
J. Hinton, Progress Report on Irrigation, Sen. Misc. Docs., 49 Cong., 2 Scss., I., No. 
rs, pp. 132-133. 
1 Elwood Mead, The Ownership of \Vatcr. Danger from Monop!ies. Denver, Time• 
Printing Works. 1887, p. 6; Report of Colo. State Engineer, 1885-1886, p. 216; u 
U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, g1. 
• 13 Annual Report, U. S. Gcol. Survey, Part III .• a1s; R. J. Hinton, Proarcas 
Report on Irrigation. p. us; u U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, 129; Select 
Commit~ on Irrigation and Reclamation of Arid !,ands, Sen. Reports, sr Cong., 1 
Sess., IV., No. g28 (Stewart Report), Pt. 4, p. 325. 
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Although non-corporate ditches predominated in 1890, a grow-
ing number of eastern slope irrigators depended for their water 
supply upon canal corporations controlling the largest and most 
important canals in the state. Those eastern counties where canal 
capacity exceeded the normal water supply in 1889-among which 
were the leading agricultural counties of the state-were largely 
served by corporate canals. 
When the constitution was framed (1876), irrigators as indi-
viduals or co-operative groups diverted directly from the natural 
stream and made beneficial use of the water on their own land. 
Hence the constitution made diversion from a natural stream, plus 
beneficial use, essential to a prior appropriation of water.7 With 
the introduction of the canal corporation the owners of a ditch di-
verting from a natural stream were not themselves users of water 
for a beneficial purpose. Should the legislature grant priorities to 
the canal corporation which did divert from a natural stream but 
did not make beneficial use of the water diverted; or, to the ir-
rigator under the canal who made beneficial use of the water but 
diverted from an artificial stream? 
The legislature did not give eff~ct to the. constitutional provisions 
governing appropriation until 1879. Alarmed by large canal projects 
higher up stream, the Union Colony irrigators on the Cache-la-
Poudre united with irrigators from the Saint V rain and Boulder 
to demand legislation enforcing priorities vested by the constitu-
tion. They met in convention in 1878 and drafted a report which 
became the basis of the state law of 1879. This law amended in 
detail, not in principle, remains the basis of the Colorado system of 
water administration. The convention recommended (I) determina-
tion of priorities by the courts; (2) granting of priorities to the 
ditch owner rather than attachment to the land watered; (3) basing 
of the volume of water decreed upon the capacity of the canal in-
stead of the amount of water used.8 Doubtless. these proposals 
seemed advantageous to the convention of irrigators owning their 
ditches or holding stock in a colony ditch. 
By the incorporation of these proposals in a law of 1879 the 
legislature served a purpose near to its heart, viz., the encourage-
ment of ditch construction with its consequent attraction of a 
farming population. It was seen that grants of water-rights to 
canals, with the privilege of sale to the working farmers, promised 
a liberal return upon the cost of construction: an opportunity cer-
Y 13 Colo. i20. 
8 D. Boyd, Irrigation Near Greeley, in House Docs., 54 Cong., 2 Sess., v. 70, 
No. 351, pp. 61-62. 
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tain to tempt the investment of outside capital.9 How successfully 
the legislature fostered corporate canal construction is attested by 
figures cited above. 
The act of r879, regulating the use of water for irrigation, or-
dered the district courts to enter a decree determining priorities 
of the several ditches in a district, each according to the date of 
construction and enlargement, with the amount of water appro-
priated by said construction and enlargement. The capacity of a 
ditch became the basis of a priority decree; beneficial use was dis-
regarded. The law recognized no distinct and independent priority 
in the consumers under the carrier canal. Thus in time of scarcity 
of water, when the aggregate supply of the carrier canal was re-
duced, the law ordered a pro rata distribution to consumers, based 
on the amount of water used rather than on priority of appropria-
tion from the canal.1° In accord with the statutes, the courts, 
generally waiving the constitutional requisite of beneficial use, is-
sued decrees of priority to the ditch corporation. Moreover, they 
did not inquire into the priorities of the several users, or secondary 
appropriators, under a corporate canal. Neither did the state water 
commissioners divide the water among the users under a corporate 
ditch.11 The commissioners diverted the aggregate water accruing 
to the priority of the canal corporation, which then divided it among 
its consumers without state interference. 
As an outgrowth of the law of r879 primary and secondary ap-
propriations developed. 
A primary appropriation was a water-right derived directly from 
the state by judicial decree, under the public laws governing the 
acquisition and administration of water-rights. The primary ap-
propriator owned the ditch diverting water from the natural stream 
and ripened the appropriation by beneficial use on his land. Most 
Colorado farmers of I890 belonged to this class. Canal corpora-
tions were also primary appropriators though they did not ripen 
their appropriation by beneficial use--this function being performed 
by irrigators.12 
A secondary appropriation was a water-right not derived directly 
from the state by judicial decree under the public laws governing 
the acquisition and administration of water-rights, but from a con-· 
tract with corporations who qualified as primary appropriators. 
I Elwood Mead, Op. cit., s-6. 
10 Colo. Session Laws. 1879, p. 97, acc. 4, p. 104, 1ec. 30; 13 Colo. 123·12.i. 
u J. S. Greene, in Annual of the American Society of Irrigation Engineers, 1892· 
1893, pp. 140-141. 
12 J. S. Greene, Acquirement of Water-Rights in the Arkansas Valley in Colo., u, 34-
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Secondary appropriators were irrigators who did not own the ditch 
diverting water from the natural stream, but participated by con-
tract in the priority of the canal coporation. The contract, though 
partially subject to state water law, imposed conditions not pre-
scribed by constitution or statute. A large and growing number of 
Colorado farmers were secondary appropriators in I89o.18 
Legislative encouragement of corporate canal construction was 
not without dangerous consequences. It interposed the canal cor-
poration as a middleman between one class of irrigators and the 
public waters dedicated by the constitution to the use of the peo-
ple of the state. To a large extent the state abdicated legislative 
and administrative control over secondary appropriators in favor 
of the contractural control of the canal corporation. Thus the 
prosperity of the secondary appropriator depended largely upon 
the terms and execution of his contract with the water corporation. 
The measure of state interference to guarantee equitable water 
contracts becomes the criterion of fair and effective regulation of 
the ditch corporations. 
The canal corporation secured. revenue from the sale of water-
rights and lands under ditch. Ofter the corporations owned land 
under their canal and sold farms with water-rights on long term 
and partial payments, taking a mortgage as security on lands thus 
sold.14 Though the canal corporation ha,d a natural monopoly in 
its district, the farmer might choose among the contracts of com-
panies in various localities, provided he purchased both land and 
water. But once having purchased land and water from a cor-
poration, he became dependent upon it for his water supply. Like-
wise the farm owner purchasing a water-right seldom found more 
than one source of supply available. To offset this natural mo-
nopoly, the companies were required, wherever they had unsold 
water in their ditch, to sell it to the class of users specified in the 
certificate of incorpation, at a legally established rate. Also, any 
person having purchased and used water for irrigation of his land 
from any ditch or reservoir, was guaranteed the right to continue 
an equivalent purchase at a legally established rate, provided he did 
not stop his purchase with the intent to procure water from some 
other source of supply.15 
Water contracts were of two classes: one selling a perpetual wa-
u J. C. Ulrich, Irrigation in the Rocky Mountain States, 1899, in U. S. Dept. 
of Agr., Office of ExP. Sta., Bull No. 73. p. 51. 
•• u U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, 91; R. J. Hinton, Op. cit., 40 ,133;. 
Irrigation Age, Feb. 1, 1892, p. 469. 
u General Statutes of Colorado, 1883, sec. 3n, p. 199; sec. 1740, p. 568. 
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ter-right itself ; the other selling a perpetual or determinate right 
to rent water annually. The unit water-right was the supply of 
water necessary to irrigate 80 acres of land, l 44-100 cubic feet of 
water per second flowing over a weir at one of the lateral head-
gates of the canal. 
In most cases the farmers under a corporate canal purchased a 
perpetual water-right. The canal company in return for pay-
ments on the principal agreed to furnish each year a stated amount 
of water continuously during a defined irrigating season; such wa-
ter to be used only for irrigation and domestic purposes on the tract 
described. It exacted, in addition to the principal, an annual as-
sessment not to exceed twelve dollars per water-right for main-
tenance of the canal works. The manner of regulating the supply 
of water was at all times under the control of the canal company. 
In case the canal was unable to carry and distribute a volume of 
water equal to its estimated capacity, either from casual or un-
foreseen or unavoidable accident; or if the volume of water proved 
insufficient from drouth, or from any other cause beyond the con-
trol of the company, it was not liable for shortage so caused. Dur-
ing the insufficiency of the water supply to satisfy all outstanding 
water-rights, the corporation had the right to distribute available 
water to consumers on a pro rata basis.16 · 
The parties agreed that, in event of failure by the consumer to 
make the instalment payments on the principal or to pay the in-
terest when due, the entire principal of the contract fell due, and 
the company had the right, at the expiration of a certain period, to 
foreclose and terminate the contract; provided, the consumer were 
given notice of such intent. Often the company held a mortgage 
on the consumer's farm as a pledge for the payment of his water-
right. The mortgage was so executed that failure to make a single 
payment caused the principal to fall due.17 
When the consumer completed the payment of the principal sum 
of this water contract, he received in exchange therefor a water 
deed, which differed from the contract only in acknowledging the 
receipt of its principal sum. The consumer continued to pay an 
annual assessment for canal operation and maintenance to the cor-
poration.18 Perpetual water-rights sold at prices varying from 
$400 to $1,200, plus the annual maintenance charge. 
Frequently the company agreed, when the volume of ·water-rights 
1
• Stewart Report, VI., Pt. 4, pp. 297, 331, 338. 
"Ibid., VI. Pt. 4, 298. 332, 339; V., Pt. 1, p. 76; n U. S. Census, Agricultur• 
by Irrigation, 95. . 
11 Stewart Report, VI.. Pt. 4, p. 303. 
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sold approximated the estimated capacity of the canal, to transfer 
to the individual consumer shares of stock, proportionate to the 
interest which a consumer's water-rights bore to the entire num-
ber of water-rights outstanding.19 
Only a few canal companies rented water annually to irrigators. 
Under this contract the canal corporation not only sold a short 
term or perpetual right to buy water, but exacted from irrigators 
an annual rental charge for the delivery of water, greater than the 
_pro rata cost of canal operation and maintenance. Such contracts 
incorporated certain standard provisions of the outright sale con-
tract: concerning control of the distribution of water, irresponsibility 
of the canal company for water shortage, and penalty for a con-
sumer's failure to make partial payments promptly. There was no 
provision for ultimate transfer. of canal stock to the consumers 
under ditch. The High Line canal charged a bonus of $ro per acre 
for the right to buy water, and an annual rental of $1.50 per acre 
for delivery of the water. To justify these charges the high cost 
of canal construction was pleaded. The rental not only defrayed 
operating expenses but applied to. the principal of construction cost. 
In 1887 the anti-royalty act invalidated the bonus feature of the 
rental contract; whereupon some consumers pref erred the deter-
minate rental contract to the perpetual sale contract. 20 
How did the state interfere to guarantee equitable water con-
tracts? 
The constitution declares the general assembly shall provide by 
law that the boards of county commissioners in their respective coun-
ties shall have power, when application is made by either party in-
terested, to establish reasonable maximum rates to be charged for 
the use of water, whether furnished by individuals or corporations. 
Accordingly, the law of 1879 constituted the elective board of county 
commissioners a quasi-judicial body to fix a just maximum rate 
for ditches, canals and reservoirs furnishing and selling water, the 
whole or upper part of which lay in the county limits. ·Requisite 
for board action was an affidavit by a consumer showing reasonable 
ground to believe that unjust prices were, or were likely to be, 
charged for water from such ditch, canal or reservoir. If the 
boards regarded the affidavit as convincing, they set a date, not 
sooner than forty days after the receipt of the affidavit, when the 
consumer and carrier were to be heard. The board examined the 
testimony of both sides, issued subpoenas to witnesses, compelled at-
.. Ibid., 298·299, 331, 338 • 
.. J. S. Greene. Acquirement of Water Rights in the Arkansas Valley in Colorado, 
"8r·83; R. J. Hinton, Op. cit., 132. 
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tendance and production of books and papers. Thereupon the com-
missioners fixed a just maximum price, which was subject to change 
once in two years.21 The price-fixing power applied only to com-
panies renting water annually. Establishment of a rate by the com-
missioners did not per se affect existing contracts between the ir-
rigator and the vendor of water; nor did it affect or hinder the mak-
ing of contracts at a rate above that fixed by the commissioners if 
the higher rate were acceptable to both contracting parties. Under 
the act of 1879 the county boards were impotent to fix a rate for 
a canal the head-works of which lay in another county. 
This defect led to the basic decision of Wheeler v. Northern 
Colorado Irrigation Company, which clearly defined the status of 
the canal corporation and declared the bonus or royalty of the rental 
contracts unconstitutional. 
The appellant owned a farm east of Denver watered by the 
High Line Ditch, the property of the Northern Colorado Irriga-
tion Company. He refused to buy in advance, at $ro per acre, the 
right to procure water at an annual rental of $r.50 per acre; where-
upon the High Line refused to deliver water, though the rental was 
proffered. Since the headgates of the canal lay in Douglas county, 
the commissioners of Arapahoe were impotent to intervene and fix 
a maximum rental. Failing in his original proceedings for manda-
mus in the supreme court, Wheeler as relator instituted mandamus 
proceedings in the district court of Arapahoe county. The respond-
ent company demurred to the alternative writ; the demurrer was 
sustained and judgment entered for the respondent. The plaintiff 
then appealed to the supreme court and was heard in the December 
term, 1887.22 
Both the constitution and the common law were invoked to re-
verse the decision of the district court. ( l) The constitution dedi-
cates all unappropriated water in the natural streams of the state 
"to the use of the people", the ownership thereof being vested in 
"the public". (2) After appropriation the title to the water re-
mains in the general public, while the paramount right to its use 
continues in the appropriator. To constitute a valid appropriation 
the water diverted must be applied within a reasonable time to some 
beneficial use. Thus the diversion ripens into a valid appropriation 
only when the water is utilized by the consumer.23 (3) It follows 
that the canal company does not become a "proprietor" of the water 
diverted, but a mere carrier, a quasi-public servant or agent. The 
:t Colo. Session Laws, I879, pp. 94·96, secs. I·2. 
" 9 Colo. 248, 256, 257; IO Colo. 582·585. 
"IO Colo. s87, 588. 
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.constitutional recognition of the carrier's right to compensation for 
transporting water, and the provision for a quasi-judicial tribunal 
to fix an equitable maximum charge, must be correspondingly in-
terpreted. Carrier's status is not that of a private individual con-
tracting for the sale or use of his private property. It exists largely 
for the benefit of others, being engaged in the business of trans-
porting for hire, water owned by the public, to the people owning 
the right to its use. The carrier is permitted to appropriate water 
.and to exercise the power of eminent domain. Its business is af-
firmatively sanctioned, and its profits are fairly guaranteed. In re-
turn for these privileges, it is, for the public good, charged with 
certain duties and subjected to a reasonable control. (4) By fair 
implication "any unreasonable regulations or demands that operate 
to withhold or prevent the exercise of this constitutional right (use 
.of water) by the consumer must be held illegal, even though there 
be no e:i..-press legislative declaration on the subject".2 i 
The respondent's demand of $Io per acre, as an advance pay-
ment of part of the transportation charge for the remaining years 
of its corporate existence, was declared "illegal as well as unrea-
sonable and oppressive".25 
Barring constitution and statutes, the court found strong legal 
ground for the position that the carrier's demands for rates, and 
the time and manner of collection, must be reasonable. "The car-
rier voluntarily engages in the enterprise; it has, in most instances, 
from the nature of things, a monopoly of the business along the 
line of its canal; its vocation, together with the use of its property, 
are closely allied to the public interest; its conduct in connection 
therewith materially affects the community at large; it is charged 
with what the decisions term a public duty or trust * * *. For 
these reasons it would be held at common law to have submitted it-
·self to a reasonable judicial control, invoked and exercised for the 
common good, in the matter of regulation of charges". In short 
the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois was applied to carriers of water.26 
Early in I887 the farmers had no assurance that the supreme 
-court would pronounce royalties illegal. Court proceedings were 
-at best a cumbersome and expensive method of controlling the rental 
.of water by corporations. And the Wheeler decision, though favor-
able to consumers, would apply to a past irrigating season. Would 
there not be an ever recurring struggle to escape the payment of 
royalties; and would not the attendant delay prevent actual ir-
"Ibid. 590. 
~Ibid. 594. 
"' Ibid. 589, 590. 
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ngation of crops? Speaking to farmers on the ownership of water 
in r887, Elwood Mead divined in the speculative development of 
canals the intent to charge water rates far above the cost of canal 
·construction, and the foundation of monopolies a hundred-fold more 
exacting than Irish landlordism.27 Beset by these fears the irrigators 
under the High Line in Arapahoe, Jefferson and Douglas counties, 
launched the Farmers' State Protective Association to lobby for the 
enactment of an anti-royalty bill by- the legislature. The ~xecutive 
committee of the association was composed of Wheeler and two 
other irrigators, all active Grangers. The fight in the senate was long 
and bitter; for three weary months the committee labored incessant-
ly. 28 On April 4, 1887, the anti-royalty bill received the governor's 
approval and was in force three months later. It fotbade the ditch 
companies to impose a royalty, bonus, or premium, prerequisite or 
.condition precedent to the right or privilege of applying or bargain-
ing for and procuring water. The penalty for violation of the law 
was a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or imprison-
ment of the officers or agents of a ditch company for a term of not 
less than three months, nor more than one year.29 
The legislature of 1887 also passed an act enabling the county 
-commissioners to fix rates within their county for "any ditch, canal, 
conduit, or reservoir, the whole or any part of which shall lie in 
-such coutity".80 Thus was remedied the defect in the statute of 
t879 which forced Wheeler to seek judicial relief from oppressive 
water rates in his county. 
Renters of water now seemed doubly fortified against the im-
-position of royalties. During the session of 1888 the master of the 
-Grange thanked God "that royalty * * * is dead-killed first by 
-public sentiment. Then by the noble justices of the Supreme Court 
-Helm and Beck-who fearlessly put their heels upon the serpent's 
hydra head. It has long threatened to crush within its deadly folds 
the occupation, the life and liberty of the farmer."31 
Water shortage in the late eighties crystallized the growing dis-
-content with the operation of the water laws and the results of the 
leading court decisions. 32 
Senior consumers under corporate canals resented the inclusion 
-of pro rating clauses, validated by the law of 1879, in all types of 
"'Elwood Mead, Op. cit., 6, 7. 
21 Journal of Proceedings of the Colorado State Grange, 1888, pp, 18, 23 • 
.. Colo. Session Laws, 1887, pp. 308, 309 • 
.. Ibid., 291, 292, sec. 1. 
•1 Journal of Proceedings of the Colorado State Grange, 1888, p, 24-
.n Report of Colo. State Engineer. 1889-1890, l., 51. 
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water contracts. The constitutionality of this practice was chal-
lenged in the case of Farmers' High Line Canal and Reservoir Co. 
et al v. Southworth (1889), an appeal to the supreme court from the 
district court of Arapahoe county. Appellant sought to enjoin the 
pro rating of the carrier's diminished supply of water (in 1888) 
between himself and certain consumers taking from the canal sub-
sequent to April l, 1881, the date of the appellant's appropriation; 
and to compel the company to furnish him the entire quantity of 
water heretofore used by him. As stated by the chief justice the 
issue was "Does the priority of appropriation, which by virtue of 
the constitution gives the better right, apply to individual consumers 
taking water through the agency of a carrier, so that notwithstand-
ing the pro rating statute, each consumer acquires a separate con-
stitutional priority of right, entitled to judicial enforcement, dat-
ing from the beginning of his specific use ?"38 Injunction was de-
nied the appellant by two of the three justices, each reaching his 
conclusion by independent arguments. Subsequent decisions have 
followed the opinion of the chief justice; so this alone will be con-
sidered. The court held: ( l) T4at the act of turning water from 
the carrier's canal into his lateral cannot be regarded as a diversion 
within the meaning of the constitution; nor can this act by itself, 
when combined with use, create a valid constitutional appropriation. 
(2) There is therefore no escape from the conclusion in the Wheeler 
action, that in cases like the present the carrier's diversion from 
the natural stream must unite with the consumer's use in order to 
create a complete appropriation within the meaning of our funda-
mental law. The constitution recognizes priorities only among those 
taking water from the natural streams. (3) All co-consumers tak-
ing water from the same ditch within a reasonable time have pri-
orities of even date with each other.84 
The United States Senate Select Committee on Irrigation, visit-
ing Denver in 1890, found the great complaint in Colorado arose 
from the payment of royalties to ·ditch companies and the alleged 
sale of water the carrying companies could not deliver.85• Farm 
leaders admitted that the law forbade royalties and gave the county 
commissioners power to fix a just water rate. However, the canal 
corporations continued to include royalties in their water rates and 
often forced payment by the irrigators. The board of county com-
missioners was powerless to force the observance of their rate by 
canal companies. If the latter refused to deliver water at the 
• 13 Colo. n9, (188g). 
at Ibid. 120, 121. 
11 Stewart Report, V., Pt. I, p. 76. 
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legally established rate, the irrigator was left to compel delivery by 
mandamtts.86 But the cost of legal action and the inevitable delay 
incident to court procedure sometimes made the payment of royalties 
the lesser of two evils. Further, both renters and purchasers of 
water-rights denounced the corporations who in their eagerness for 
revenue sold water-rights beyond their capacity to deliver. Fre-
quently the farmer did not receive the water paid for in advance; 
he found his crops burned and was unable to meet the interest on 
the mortgage given to the .water company for land and water-right. 
There was repeated testimony that the water company had all the 
penalties on the farmer, and that he was powerless to collect dam-
ages for non-delivery of water stipulated in his contract.37 
To give temporary relief to the irrigators, it was urged that the 
state have power to say when the waters of a given stream were 
exhaust~d, and to prevent further building of ditches under such 
conditions; also, that state officials should control the headgates and 
laterals of consumers under a corporate canal. Then the state could 
check the sale of water to consumers with the amount delivered and 
with the volume of the canal's priority. The ultimate remedy ·pro-
posed was state ownership of corporate canal works.88 
Under the auspices of leaders of farm organizations the irrigators 
launched an independent party in the state campaign of 18go. The 
leading plank of the Independent platform demanded· the recogni-
tion of priorities among co-consumers and the establishment of a 
system whereby "the state may acquire, conduct, own, and operate 
all ditches and reservoirs".39 Following the surer mode of zigzag 
the Republican convention urged a revision of the irrigation laws, 
and deprecated the practice in vogue of ditch companies selling and 
receiving pay in advance for water which they could not possibly 
deliver;'0 Since the consumers under corporate canals were but a 
minority of the farming population, which in tum was outnumbered 
by other occupations, the outcome of this state election is not sur-
prising. The Independents polled 6.7% of the combined vote of the 
old parties.41 Lack of leadership, funds and organization made 
doubly sure the defeat of the Grangers at the polls. . 
Early in I8gI the Colorado Farmers' Protective Union was formed 
to check the dissipation of strength inherent in isolated and in-
M Ibid. VI., Pt. 4, pp. 348, 361, 36:1. 
11 Ibid., V., Pt. l, p. 76; VI.,, Pt. 4, pp. 346, 347, 351. 
• Ibid., VI., Pt. 4, pp. 348, 350. 
•Rocky Mountain News. Aug. zz, 1890 • 
.. Denvex Republican, Sept. 19, zo, 1890. 
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dependent organizations seeking reform of water law.42 The execu-
tive committee of the Union lobbied in the legislature for a bill pro-
viding public officials to measure the exact amount of water delivered 
by ditch companies to each farmer; for two deposits in the county 
treasurer's office to cover the annual water charge, said deposits to 
be disbursed to the ditch company only upon evidence that the water 
was actually furnished to the irrigator; and for the dissolution of 
any company overselling its water supply. This bill died in the 
legislature. ' 8 
Apropos of the Union's legislative activities, the Rocky Mountain 
News denounced corporate efforts to repeal the anti-royalty act 
and bitterly arraigned the water companies. "To collect pay for 
water they do not carry, to require royalties aµd bonuses before 
they sell water, to set themselves up as privileged organizations not 
subject to commercial losses, as other people,-all these assumptions 
are a part and parcel of corporate arrogance borne far too long."44 
Eminent engineers and a non-partisan commission have in large 
part confirmed the various indictments of water companies. The 
Colorado Irrigation Commission provided by the legislature in 1889 
consisted of an ex-state engineer, ·a ditch promoter, and a judge, 
appointed by the governor to report a revision of the state irriga-
tion law. Reporting in 1890 the commission essayed a remedy 
for the over-sale of water-rights, but did not subscribe to the de-
nunciation of royalties by the engineer member or to his demand 
for greater protection of co-consumers under a corporate ditch.45 
Mr. J. S. Greene, the minority member, vigorously assailed the 
Colorado water law in a paper read before the American Society 
of Irrigation Engineers in 1892. He declared statute law had en-
couraged one class of citizens to prey upon another by a· failure to 
recognize the full constitutional rights of users of water, and by 
magnifying the rights of those who simply effected the diversion 
and conveyance of water. Hence the ditch companies had assumed 
not only the rights of appropriators of water but claimed a right 
in water equivalent to ownership, and presumed to dictate not only 
the price of water-rights, but also who may and who shall not use 
the public waters.48 He urged stringent legislation to prohibit royal-
ties effectively, and to establish an equality of rights between. car-
.. Colorado Fanner, Jan. 1, 1891; Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 9, I891. 
<a Rocky Mountain News, Jan. Io, 189I • 
.. Ibid. Feb. 9, 1891 • 
.. Report of the Commission Appointed by His Excellency, the Governor of the 
State of Colorado, to Revise the Laws of the State Regulating the Appropriation, Dis-
tribution and Use of Water, Denver, 1890, p. Io. 
"Ann~al of the American Society of Irrigation Engineers, 1892-1893, p. 140. 
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riers and consumers by a determination of ( l) the manner of ac-
-quiring the right to divert, right to use and the right to appropriate 
water, (2) the extent of enjoyment of these rights, (3) the mutual 
relations of these rights and the necessary limitations upon their 
cxercise.47 A year earlier Elwood Mead, at one time assistant state 
engineer, wrote "there is no question of the need to guard the rights 
.and privileges connected with the diversion and transportation of 
water to the place of use, but this does not necessitate total disre-
gard of the rights of a user. The basing of appropriation on con-
struction of ditches was a primitive conception * * *. Appropria-
tion should be based on use, and when made for irrigation, should 
be attached to the land reclaimed and water rights made to go with 
land titles."48 
The Granger agitation for drastic reform of the water law evoked 
.i10 response from the legislators preoccupied with the vagaries of a 
Populist administration, industrial disorders, and free silver politics. 
Neither in the nineties nor subsequently did the legislature enact 
any fundamental changes in the laws of 1879 and 1887 regulating 
ditch corporations. Matters clearly within the province of the leg-
islature have been thrown upon ~e courts, and the slow and cum-
brous judicial machinery has been set to grinding out a conclusion 
concerning water rights, which the dictum of the legislature could 
have established by law in a single session. If the legislature has 
been remiss in its obligation to afford equal protection under the 
law to irrigators and ditch corporations, the courts-by contrast at 
least-have shown commendable zeal in dispensing even-handed 
justice to farmer and capitalist alike. There has been slight devia-
·tion from the ideal of the supreme bench enunciated in 1887: "The 
courts should protect the consumer in the full enjoyment of his 
.constitutional and statutory rights; but they should also jealously 
guard the rights of the carrier, and so deal with it (the constitution 
and statutes permitting) as to encourage the investment of capital in 
the construction of reservoirs and canals for the storage and trans-
portation of water".49 A long line of decisions following and ex-
panding the ·wheeler case has done much to solve vexing problems 
properly within legislative competence, such as definition of the 
property right in priorities, prevention of speculative holding of 
water, provision of damages for a failure to deliver the volume 
of water paid for in advance, protection of the rights of irrigators 
against excess sale of water by the canal company, definition of 
"Ibid. 1892·1893, p. 142 • 
.,. Irrigation Age, June 15, 1891, p. 85. 
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"estimated capacity" as used in water contracts, and the adoption 
of a standard for fixing reasonable water rates. 
The decision of the supreme court in Strickler v. Colorado Springs 
( 1891) awakened the fear that ditch companies would be permitted 
lo hold water as a purely speculative commodity. It was held that 
"a priority to the use of water for irrigation is a property right, and 
may be sold and transferred ·separately from the land in connection 
with which the right ripened".60 However, a reassuring exposition 
of this decision in Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Company (1892) 
removed such apprehension. Basic premises were found in the 
Wheeler and Southworth cases : ( l) the carrier in and of itself has 
no independent priority (though the irrigation statutes use lan-
guage that might give this impression), and any rights it may hold 
in connection with the water diverted depend for their continuance 
upon the use made by consumers. ( 2) The carrier becomes the 
agent of the consumer, and exists for the purpose of aiding him in 
the exercise of his constitutional right to the use of water owned 
by the public.61 Therefore, the court found that "the ownership of 
a prior right to the use of water is essentially different from the 
ownership of stock in an irrigating company. The ownership of 
the stock like the title to other property may be acquired by descent 
or purchase; the ownership of the prior right can be acquired orig-
inally only by the actual beneficial use of the water * * *· He (the 
stockholder) may transfer his stock to whom he will; but he can 
only transfer his priority to some one who will continue to use the 
water * * *· If ditch companies were at liberty to divert· water 
without limit and at the same time make the ownership of stock an 
absolute condition precedent to the right to procure water from their 
irrigation canals, water rights would soon become a matter of specu-
lation and monopoly * * * ."62 
The practical import of this decision was that ditch owners not 
making beneficial use of diverted water within a reason.able time, 
had to dispose of it for a proper consideration to irrigators pre~ 
pared to make beneficial use thereof. To this end the writ of 
mandam1,ls was an appropriate remedy. But such writ was in~ 
appropriate to secure a perpetual right to the use of water; at 
most it enforced an annually recurring right dependent, among other 
things, upon an annual tender of the water rate. In the New 
Mercer Ditch Company v. Armstrong (1895) non-use of water for 
"° 16 Colo. 61, 62. 
111 13 Colo. 121, Farmers' High Line Canal and Reservoir Company v. Southworth. 
"'17 Colo. 151, 152, Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Company. 
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a period of nine years was considered unreasonable and working 
forfeiture of the priority.53 
A fruitful cause of Granger discontent was that water contracts, 
while they penalized the irrigator for the slightest delay in payment 
of water rates, practically absolved the ditch company from liability 
for failure to deliver the stipulated volume of water. In Pawnee 
Land and Canal Company v. Jenkins (1892) the ruling was: "a 
ditch company that contracts with a patron to furnish him water 
for irrigation, and fails to comply with its contract, by reason 
whereof the patron suffers damages in loss of crops, is not relieved 
from liability to damages by the mere fact of scarcity of water in 
the stream from which the ditch was supplied, if by the diligent em-
ployment of proper measures to utilize the water that was in the 
stream the catastrophe might have been averted. The company can 
only be exonerated on proof of circumstances clearly showing that 
the failure to perform was chargeable to vis major, and not to negli-
gence and inattention."54 A similar decision, Rocky Ford Canal, 
Reservoir, Land, Loan and Triest Company v. Simpson (1894), 
was gratefully acclaimed by the Rocky Mountain News. "For years 
they (ditch companies) have been robbing farmers of the state by 
collecting rents in advance and then delivering water or not as the 
same was convenient. If the farmer failed to get his water, and 
lost his crop, he did not even get back the money he paid for it. 
The robbery is now ended."55 
Of vital importance to purchasers of perpetual water-rights was 
the interpretation of the term "estimated capacity" employed in 
water contracts. Upon this construction depended ( l) the protec-
tion of early purchasers of water-rights against subsequent excess 
sale; (2) the date of transfer of the ditch company's stock to a 
new company composed of paid-up purchasers of the first com-
pany's water-right; (3) the extent of responsibility of the new 
company for water-rights sold by the original ditch corporation. 
In Wyatt et al. v. The Larimer and Weld Irrigation Company 
the appellants sought to enjoin the company from selling additional 
water-rights beyond the 3660 then outstanding, and from pro 
rating any of the water flowing in its canal at any time, when there 
is not sufficient water to supply the existing water-rights, among 
any other or additional holders in excess of 3660 rights ; for the 
canal could not furnish water in excess of these rights. 56 The ap-
"' 21 Colo. 358, 365. 
"' 1 Colo. App. 425 • 
.. 5 Ibid., 34, 35; Irrigation Age, June, 1894, v. 6, p. 271. 
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pellees admitted the inability of the company to furnish water in. 
excess of the water-rights then outstanding, but contended, notwith-
standing, that it had the right to dispose of water-rights (accord-
ing to its contracts) up to the estimated capacity of the canal. Pro 
rating of earlier priorities would assure some supply to the later 
'1olders. The issue was clearly joined: did estimated capacity mean 
the carrying capacity of the canal or the furnf.shing capacity, the 
ability to supply and deliver water ?57 Viewing the contract in the 
light of the status accorded to canal corporations in the Wheeler 
case the court sustained the plea of furnishing capacity as the proper 
meaning of "estimated capacity." Contracts giving a corporation 
the right to dispose of definite water-rights, and by ambiguous ex-
pressions in subsequent provisions reserving the power to render 
such rights uncertain and indefinite, by disposing of water-rights 
admittedly in excess of its ability to furnish water, were not only 
inequitable and unfair but clearly illegal. Under such circumstances 
the canal corporation impaired well defined rights of consumers 
instead of acting as an intermediate agency to aid them in the ex-
ercise of their constitutional rights.58 
Important applications of this interpretation of estimated capacity 
were made in La Junta ancl Lamar Canal Company v. Hess (1895)~ 
and Larimer ancl Welcl Irrigation Company et al. v. Wyatt (1897). 
In these cases it was held that the company having sold and out-
standing water-rights equal to its capacity to furnish water, for 
two-thirds of which it had been paid, the appellee was entitled to 
relief compelling the company to perform that part of its contract 
relating to the organization of a new corporation and the change of 
ownership and control of the canal. 59 Thus performance of the 
water company's agreement to transfer its stock under certain con-
ditions to paid-up purchasers of a fixed percentage of its water-
right was guaranteed. 
With the transfer of a water corporation's stock to paid-up ven-
dees of its priority, the question arose, "Were the vendees bound 
to recognize the sale of water-rights by the vendor in excess of its 
canal's estimated capacity?" This question was squarely before the 
court in Blakely v. The Fort Lyon Canal Company (1903). Here 
it was declared that the purchasers of water-rights up to the esti-
mated capacity of the canal became its owners ; by their contracts of 
purchase they assumed no obligations other than those mentioned 
in the several deeds, which were limited to the maintenance and 
If Ibid. 309-3II • 
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control of the system after the ownership was vested in a com-
pany representing the purchasers ; that the company now repre-
senting the purchasers assumed no further obligations; and that 
when the estimated capacity of the canal had been disposed of, 
there was nothing more vested in either of the vendor companies 
to sell, and the purchasers of excess rights took nothing by their 
purchase. Moreover, the contracts of excess purchasers stated that 
the vendor company had authority only to sell rights within the 
estimated capacity of its canal; hence the purchasers were put upon 
inquiry into previous sales. Since a reasonably diligent inquiry into 
the status of the vendor's right to water would have disclosed its 
previous disposal, the excess purchasers had acquired constructive 
notice of this disposal at the time of their respective purchases.00 
The plea that the canal had an estimated capacity equivalent to the 
volume evidenced by recognized deeds and contracts cancelled as 
excess sales, was unavailing. In the Wyatt case it was authorita-
tively settled that estimated capacity meant the ability of the canal 
to supply or deliver water; that into this determination entered not 
only physical capacity of the canal but the volume of its decreed 
priority, and the probability of obtaining water therefrom under 
normal conditions during the season of irrigation.61 
A crowning difficulty thrust upon the courts for solution was the 
establishment of water rates satisfactory both to consumer and 
the ditch corporation. Exaction of a bonus or royalty has taken 
one of two forms: (I) imposition as a prerequisite to the right to 
rent water annually; (2) inclusion of the bonus in the annual rental 
in the shape of excessive water rates. Both forms have been re-
peatedly nullified by orders of the county commissioners and court 
decrees. However, the county commissioners are powerless to en-
force their rates; so the consumer must often resort to mandamus 
to compel delivery of water at the legally established rate. As 
recently as 1912 the supreme court was called upon to declare invalid 
the exaction of a bonus by a ditch corporation, as a condition of 
performing its constitutional duty, the delivery. of water to the 
consumer.62 
The counter evil to royalties was the establishment of confiscatory 
water rates by the county commissioners responsible to the people. 
In Golden Canal Company v. Bright (1884) the supreme court an-
nounced, "We may agree fully with counsel that a review of the 
decision of the board of county commissioners in the premises ought 
"'31 Colo. 234, 235. 
11 Ibid. 237-239 • 
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to be provided. There is opportunity for gross injustice to the 
ditch owner on the one hand, or the consumer on the other, as the in-
terest or inclination of the commissioners might dictate. But ottr 
duty is to construe the statute, not to enact it; and·as the law now 
stands no appeal from such decisions is provided".03 This opinion 
was reaffirmed in South Boulder and R. C. Ditch Company v. Mar-
.fell et al. ( l8go) ; and the causi •• .g the county commissioners to fix a 
rate for water from the company's ditch, and declining to pay more 
than such a rate, was adjudged a proper termination of a rental 
contract.64 
Drawing upon the armory of federal precedents the courts found 
warrant, l8g5-18g6, for the judicial review of water rates fixed 
by the county commissioners. In Leadville Water Company v. 
City of Leadville et al. ( l8g6) the supreme court following C. M. 
& St. P. Ry. Compa1iy v. Minnesota ( 134 U. S. 418) admitted the 
power of the l~slature to regulate the compensation of individuals 
or corporations exercising public franchises or services, provided 
such compensation were reasonable, subject to judicial inquiry and 
. determination, and not so inadequ~te as to work confiscation of prop-
erty, or to take property without due process of law.65 Aside from 
federal precedents this decision was a logical extension of the Wyatt 
case protecting prior purchasers of water against impairment of 
their rights by excess sale. The court then said : "a priority of right 
to the use of water, being property, is protected by our constitution 
so that no person can be deprived of it without 'due process of 
law'." Both the ditch company and consumer shared the property 
right in a prior appropriation of water. 
The doctrine of judicial review of the rates established by the 
county commissioners was amplified in Montezuma County v. 
Montezuma Water and Land Conipany (1907). Fortified by the 
federal decisions in Covington, etc. Company v. Sandford, Smyth 
v. Ames, and the Railroad Commission cases, the supreme court de-
nied that the county commissioners' regulatory power gave them 
the authority to confiscate the property of the ditch owner; neither 
did it give them the authority to compel the ditch owner to carry 
the water without compensation. And since it clearly appeared 
from the allegations of the complaint that the revenue to be de-
rived by the plaintiff under the maximum rate as fixed by the com-
missioners was insufficient to pay the e~pense of maintenance and 
operation of the system of canals and pay the taxes thereon, so 
a 8 Colo. 155. 
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that water could not be delivered without a loss, the result was not 
only that plaintiff's property was taken without compensation, but 
the plaintiff was compelled to pay for the privilege of rendering 
the service of its waterworks. Hence the injunction of the district 
court to restrain the enforcement of the rate fixed by the county 
commissioners of Montezuma was sustained.06 
The strength of this decision \,.ts impaired by McCracken v. 
Montezuma Water and Land Company (1914). In 1895 the dis-
trict court of Montezuma county enjoined the enforcement of a 
water rate fixed by the county commissioners. Upon a second 
petition the commissioners re-enacted the same rate (1903) set 
down in the order vacated by the district court in 1895. It was held 
by the court of appeals that fixing of the same rate by the board 
was not to be regarded as a violation of the injunction, and not be-
fog assailed in any direct proceeding, and no lack of jurisdiction 
or excess authority being shown, the rate prescribed thereby be-
-came the lawful maximum rate binding on all concerned. Such 
ruling would appear to entail a vicious circle of rate-fixing and 
injunctions. 67 
To conclude. In the wake of railroad extension came the specu-
lative development of canal corporations in the eighties, fostered 
rather than controlled by legislative enactments. Since 1890 Colo-
rado has been deeply concerned with the full utilization of canals 
-constructed in the eighties, and the adjustment of the relations of 
the ditch corporation and its consumers to each other and the state. 
The period of adjustment has not yet ended. To this fact the un-
settled problems of state intervention in the sale and delivery of 
water by corporations bear ample testimony. But various factors 
11ave operated to ease the strain incident to the dependence of con-
sumers for their prosperity upon the policy of the corporate mid-
·dleman interposed between themselves and the water dedicated to 
the public use. Chief among these mitigating factors have been 
the increase in water supply by the construction of reservoirs and 
the more economical use of water, the rise in general farm prices, 
.and the gradual mutualization of corporate canals in accordance 
with the stipulations of water contracts. By the trans£ er of cor-
porate stock to consumers, co-operative management of canal works 
is effected, and the evils of corporate control are practically elim-
inated. This transitional nature of the canal corporation must be 
borne in mind to avoid misapprehension of its economic significance 
., 39 Colo. x73·176 • 
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on the basis of current census statistics of commercial and co-opera-
tive irrigation enterprises. 
By its invitation to settlement in the traditional desert the canal 
corporation advanced the conquest of arid America, our last frontier. 
And the pioneer, fully provided with canals and surrounded by 
neighboring consumers of water, invoked state aid to protect him-
self against corporate control of his water supply. He appealed 
in vain to the legislature which continued to exemplify a tendency 
decried· by Major Powell in 1879. "The pioneers in the new coun-
tries of the United States have invariably been characterized by en-
terprise and industry and an intense desire for the speedy develop-
ment of their new homes * * *· Under the impetus of this spirit, 
irrigation companies are organized and capital invested in irrigating 
canals, and but little heed is given to philosophic considerations of 
political economy or to the ultimate condition of affairs in _which 
their present enterprises will result."68 The quickest and most ef-
fective response to the pioneer appeals came from the courts. They 
proved to be more alive to the necessity of state control over the 
relations of carrier and consume.r in the interest of_ equal justice 
to both and the public welfare than the guardians of popular rights 
in the legislature. 
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